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ABSTRACT
Debt  problems  of  developing  countries  seriously constrain  their  economic  and
social  development  as well  as  the  prospects  and  pace  of  economic  recovery  in
the  developed  countries.  Debt  and  trade  problems  of  Mexico  are  particularly
important for  the  U.S. agricultural economy because  of  the  size  and  importance
of  U.S.-Mexican  agricultural  trade.  The  importance  of  Mexico  as  a  U.S.
trading  partner  lends  importance  to  research  on  Mexican  supply,  demand,  and
trade  of  agricultural  commodities  and  on  macroeconomic  and  monetary  policies
affecting  Mexico's  demand  and  capacity  to  import.  The  ninth  meeting  of  the
Consortium  on  Trade  Research  focused  on  the  debt,  trade,  and  payments  problems
of developing countries and on U.S.-Mexican  economic relationships.
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iiiPREFACE
This  report  summarizes  papers  and  discussions  at  the  ninth  meeting  of  the
Consortium  on  Trade  Research  held  in  Tucson,  Arizona,  December  15-17,  1983.
Organizers  were Jimmye  S. Hillman,  Maury E. Bredahl,  and  Charles  E.  Hanrahan.
The  consortium  focused attention on  debt  problems  of  the  developing  countries,
U.S.-Mexican  trade  relationships,  Mexican  agricultural  and  trade  policy,  and
research  needs on Mexican  agriculture.  Copies  of  the  papers  presented  at  the
consortium or  in their final form are available from the  authors.
This  summary  was  prepared  by  Charles  E. Hanrahan,  Economic  Research  Service,
U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (now with  the  Congressional  Research Service),
and  Maury  E. Bredahl,  Department  of  Agricultural  Economics,  University  of
Missouri.  Summaries  were  prepared  from  materials  submitted  by  the
contributors to  the consortium.
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The  major  developing  country  debtors  are  making  structural  changes  and
difficult  policy  decisions  in  order  to  meet  their  debt  service  obligations.
Much  of  the  burden  of  adjustment  and  of  maintaining  debt  service  payments
falls  on  the developing countries  and  groups  in society  least  able  to  sustain
cuts  in  their  living  standards.  The  current  shortage  of  credit  and  rising
interest rates  make  it  difficult  for  developing country  debtors  to  realize  the
revenue  streams  from  investments  made  in  the  seventies.  Mexico  is  such  a
case.  Much  of  its  current  economic  difficulty  is  rooted  in  external
disturbances.  Mexico's  future  economic  health  depends  largely  on  its  ability
to  generate  a surplus  of  foreign  exchange  through  exports  of  energy and  other
products.
The  ninth  Consortium  on  Trade  Research  focused  attention  on  the  generic
problem  of  debt  of  the  developing  countries,  U.S.-Mexican  agricultural  trade,
and  research  needed  to  understand  better  U.S.-Mexican  agricultural  trade
relations.
U.S.-Mexican  agricultural  trade  flourished  during  the  seventies.  Mexico's
imports  of  U.S.  agricultural  products  expanded  largely  as  a  result  of  a
rapidly growing Mexican economy, declining per capita  production of  major  crop
and  livestock  products,  generous  food  subsidies,  and  a  rapidly  expanding
population.  Credit  currently  plays  an  important  role  in  enabling  the  United
States  to  supply and Mexico to  import U.S. food and feed grains.
A  number  of  trade  policy  problems  complicate  U.S.-Mexican  economic
relationships.  Mexico wants  to  diversify  its  export  trade  and  move  away  from
heavy  dependence  on  the  United  States  as  both  a  supplier  and  market  for
Mexican goods.  Mexico still maintains a range of  import  duties  on  basic foods
and  agro-industrial  inputs  and  uses  import  licenses  and  taxes  to  control
trade.  A  troublesome  issue  is  Mexican  unwillingness  to  join  the  General
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  There  are,  however,  intergovernmental
mechanisms in place  to  facilitate resolution of U.S.-Mexican trade disputes.
The  consortium  focused  also  on  the  political  economy  of  Mexican  agriculture.
The  rationale  for  government  involvement  in  the  Mexican  agricultural  sector
has  evolved  considerably  since  the  1910  Revolution.  By  successive
administrations,  Mexican  agriculture  has  been  considered  as  a  candidate  for
reform and  for  redistribution  of  resource  ownership  and  income,  as  an  engine
of  growth  of  the  domestic  economy, as  an  adjunct  to  the  industrialization  of
the  Mexican economy,  and  most  recently  as  a  source  of  food  self-sufficiency.
The  major  factors  shaping  Mexican  agricultural  policy  have  been  the
internationalization  of  the  Mexican  economy,  the  growth  in  importance  of
agribusiness,  the  growth  of  petroleum  exports  during  the  seventies,  and  most
recently the fiscal and foreign exchange  crisis  of the early eighties.
Mexico  is  so  important  to  U.S.  agriculture  that  it  is  a  major  focus  of
research  in  the Economic Research  Service  (ERS).  Not  only must  ERS  give  high
priority  to  improving  the  agricultural  data  base  for  Mexico,  but  it  must
monitor  and  forecast  Mexican  economic  and  agricultural  developments.  Four
broad areas of  research on Mexican agriculture are  required:  supply potential
and  supply  response;  domestic  demand;  macroeconomic  and  monetary  factors
affecting demand and imports;  and policies affecting supply, demand, and trade.
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DEBT,  TKADE,  AND  PAYMENT  ISSUES  AND  THE  MEXICAN  CASE
The Indebtedness Problems of the Major Developing Country Borrowers
by Chandra Hardy
While  the major  debtor  countries  suffer  from a  cash  squeeze  in  meeting  their
present debt  service obligations,  their  productive  capacity  has  substantially
expanded  over  the  past  decade.  The  largest  debtors  are  middle-income
countries  which  have  achieved  rapid  rates  of  output  growth  and  built  up
impressive  production  capabilities.  But  the  shortage  of  credit  and  the  rise
in interest rates add to the  delays and  reduce the  revenue stream of  many good
projects.
Debtor  countries  are making  structural  changes and  difficult  policy  decisions
in  a  period  of  reduced  growth,  but  they  appear  to  b  approaching  the  social
limits  of  such  adjustments.  The  burden  of  adjustment  and  of  maintaining
debt-service payments  falls  entirely  on  the  developing  countries  and  on  those
groups  in  society  least  able  to  bear  the  cuts  in  living  standards.  To  meet
the  challenge  of  their  rapidly  growing labor  force  and  to  protect  the  gains
they  have  made  over  the  past  two  to  three  decades,  debtor  countries  have  to
move from austerity to recovery.
A  recovery  of  output growth  in the  developing  countries  is  also  needed  for  a
recovery  in  the  industrial  countries.  During  the  seventies,  the  value  of
world  trade  grew almost  sixfold  to  exceed  $1,700  billion  in  1980,  increasing
at  7-8  percent  per  annum in  real  terms.  While  the  bulk  of  this  trade  took
place among  the  industrial  countries,  the  fastest  growing  trade was  among  the
developing  countries.  Manufactured exports  of  developing countries grew at  25
percent per annum in current  prices.
This phenomenal  expansion of  trade was facilitated by  the easy availability of
large  volumes  of  commercial  bank  credit.  Indeed,  the  explosive  growth  of
financial markets was necessary to  this  trade development and  its  decline is  a
factor in  the  current  decline  in trade  growth.  In  1980  for  the first  time  in
the  postwar  period,  trade  grew more  slowly  than  output  growth.  Initially  the
decline  in  credit  may  have  been  in  response  to  the  slowdown  in  trade  growth
due to  the  recession, but it  has since been the dampening factor.The  developing  countries  account  for  40  percent  of  the  exports  of  the
industrial  countries  and  if  there  is  to  be  a  recovery  in  the  developed
countries  without  a  resurgence  of  inflationary  pressures,  the  recovery  will
probably have to  be export-led.  Measures to  ease the  global  liquidity problem
are therefore urgently needed.  Improving the term  structure of the  debt would
be a first step.
The Mexican Economy:  A Sectorial View
by S. Kenneth Schwedel
A seemingly ever-increasing demand for oil at  ever-increasing  price levels  led
Mexico  to  quick  and easy  solutions  to  long-term  social  and economic  problems.
Financed  by  deficit  spending,  the  Mexican  Government's  stimulation  of  the
economy  resulted in annual  real growth of  Gross  National  Product  in  excess  of
8 percent  in  the  late  seventies  and  early  eighties.  The  rapid  growth  of  the
economy  induced rapid  inflation  and, despite devaluation,  an  overvalued  peso.
The  situation was  aggravated in  1981 when, faced with a  fall  in  the  price  of
oil, the Government  increased borrowing  to avoid slowing  the  rate of  growth.
The  dimension of  the  economic  crisis  emerged  in  1982.  In  order  to  halt  the
flight  of  capital,  exchange  controls  were  imposed  and  the  peso  devalued  from
26.6  to  the  dollar  in  January  to  nearly  150  at  year's  end.  The  devaluation
and  other  controls  reduced  imports,  primarily  by  the  private  sector.  The
downturn  in  economic  activity  coupled  with  increased  Government  spending
caused the deficit to grow to over 17  percent of GNP.
In this  environment, the de la Madrid  administration formulated a new economic
policy at  the  end  of  1982.  This  policy,  geared  toward  meeting  the  goals  of
the  IMF  agreement,  can  be  described  in  one  word,  austerity.  In  order  to
reduce  the  deficit,  taxes  have  been  increased  and  subsidization  of  consumer
goods has been slashed.  All of  these  events  have led to  a dramatic, pervasive
contraction of the economy.
Retail  sales  are  estimated  to  be  off  15  percent;  consumer  durables,  down  35
percent.  Car  production  has  fallen  35  percent;  truck  production,  down  61
percent.  A  bright  spot  is  foreign  tourism  estimated  to  have  increased  24
percent.  Inflation  will  exceed  100  percent,  placing  pressure  on  the
Government to increase wages.
The  Government  faces  a number  of  difficult  decisions  in  1984.  A  decision  to
stimulate  the  economy  could  lead  to  the  contraction-expansion  dichotomy
characterizing  management  of  the  Mexican  economy.  Previous  administrations
have  been  unwilling  or  unable  to  hold  to  self-imposed  limits.  The  probable
result  will  be  an  easing  up,  but  not  a  clear  expansionist  policy.  If  the
deficit  increased  to  between  5.5  percent  and  6.5  percent  of  GNP,  average
inflation will exceed 50 percent, but  then will expand about 2 percent in real
terms.  The  clear  danger  is  to  fall  prey  to  pressures  to  over  stimulate  the
economy.Third-Country Monetary Disturbances in a Changed International  Economy:
The  Case of Brazil and Mexico
by  G.  Edward  Schuh
The emerging  international economic  system affects  the  economic  performance  of
individual  countries.  Brazil  and  Mexico are  two  important case  studies.  The
decline  in  the  dollar's  value  in  the  seventies  helped  Brazil  weather  the
effects  of  the  first  oil  shock, while  the  rise  in  the value  of  the dollar  in
the  eighties  complicated  Brazil's  adjustment  to  the  second  oil  shock.  What
most  distinguishes  the  Mexican  experience  are  the  large  monetary  shocks
associated  with  large  fluctuations  in  the  real  exchange  rate.  The  most
important  institutional  and  policy  implications  from  the  experience  of  these
two  countries  is  the  extent  to  which  their  difficulties  were  rooted  in
external  disturbances.  This  points  to  the  need  to  reform  the  international
financial institutions.
Foreign-Exchange Constraints and Mexican Agricultural Trade
by Philip C.  Abbott
Mexico's  foreign  debt  problem  and  the  adjustments  to  reduce  Mexico's
staggering  debt  burden  are  important  issues  for  U.S.  agricultural  trade.
Mexico  is  not  only  an  important  exporter  to  and  a competitor  in  some  U.S.
agricultural  markets,  but  also  a  substantial  importer  of  U.S.  grains  and
oilseeds.  Economic  policies  adopted  in  Mexico  have  altered  the  price
structure and incentives  to  trade  and  have  caused  severe  reductions  in  income
growth, dampening import demand.
The  purpose  of  special  Purdue  University  research  is  to  understand  the
linkages  between  a  developing  country's  foreign  exchange  position  and  its
agricultural  trade.  Mexico  provides  an  example  of  problems  being  experienced
in  many  developing  countries,  so  modeling  approaches  are  being  developed  and
tested  for  Mexico  which  are  to  be  extended  to  other  countries.  The  notions
behind  this  research and  the  model  used  are  that  developing  countries  were  a
dynamic  force  in  expansion  of  agricultural  trade  in  the  seventies  due  to  their
rapid  income  growth,  and  that  foreign  exchange  shortages  will  hamper  continued
expansion.  Hence,  a  disaggregated  version  of  the  two-gap  model  of  Chenery
emphasizing  the  agricultural  sector  has  been  constructed  for  Mexico  and  is
used to  investigate these  issues.
Preliminary results indicate  that  the  model  can  be  used to  explain  the causes
of  Mexico's  current  difficulties  and  to  predict  the  impact  of  certain
policies.  Longrun  projections  indicate  that  Mexico's  future  as  an
agricultural  importer  hinges  on  its ability  to  continue  to  generate  a  surplus
of  foreign  exchange  through  the  export  of  energy.  Mexico's  agricultural
comparative  advantage  depends  on  the  exchange  rate,  which  in  turn  depends  on
Mexico's  ability  to  generate  foreign  exchange  from  other  sectors  of  the
economy, especially energy.Discussion by Richard R. Barichello
The  papers by Hardy, Schwedel, and  Schuh ranged from  a  sectoral  review  of  the
Mexican  economy,  to  an  overview  of  newly  industrialized  country  (NIC)
indebtedness,  to  a  comprehensive  survey  of  trade  and  payments  issues.l/
Schwedel's  detailed  survey  of  different  sectors  of  the  Mexican  economy
provides  documentation  of  several  of  Hardy's  statements  on  indebtedness  for
the  case  of  Mexico.  His  generally  optimistic  conclusions,  however,  could  be
tempered  by  the  withdrawal  of  new  commercial  bank  lending  and  consequent
difficulty  in  Mexican  financing  cited  by  Hardy, and  the  global  institutional
reform challenges noted by Schuh.
Hardy's  illuminating  paper  on  NIC  indebtedness  gave  particular  attention  to
debt restructuring and default.  She  elaborated on  the reasons  for  the current
problems,  concluding  that  they  were  largely  exogenous  to  the  affected
countries.  As  Schuh  also  notes,  this  contradicts  casual  impressions  that
debtor  mismanagement  has  been  the  major  cause.  Hardy's  explanations  do  not
include  the  possibility  of  default  as  a  policy  option  which,  under  some
conditions, may be a rational choice.
Schuh  addressed  the  increased  economic  interrelations  among  countries  and
examined  the  recent  crises  in  Brazil  and  Mexico.  On  the  former,  his
insightful  synthesis  included  increased  trade,  the  international  capital
market,  and  flexible  exchange  rates.  The  importance  of  the  United  States  in
these  areas,  particularly  U.S.  monetary  instability,  was  emphasized.  A
concluding  note  of  warning  was  made  that  solutions  to  these  problems  will
require major  institutional  restructuring,  with attention  to  flexibility  and
policies  of  adjustment.  The  international  dairy  market  is  a  good  example.
Accommodation  of  mounting  surplus  production  and  coordination  of  autarkic
domestic policies will require creative new institutional arrangements.
1/  Abbott's  paper was  not  presented  in  this  session  and  was  therefore  not
discussed by Barichello.
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The  Trade  Environment
by Clark W. Reynolds
The history of U.S.-Mexico  trade  is  one of  increasing interdependence  in  terms
of  both  the  absolute  and  relative  importance  of  trade  to  each  country.  The
Mexican  share  of  U.S.  total  and  agricultural  imports  has  risen  to  third
place.  Mexico,  currently  the  seventh  largest  importer  of  U.S.  agricultural
products,  ranked third a few years  ago.  Mexican  exports  to  the  United  States
increased from almost  $900 million in  the  early seventies  to almost  $9 billion
in  the  early  eighties,  with  much  of  the  increase  due  to  energy  exports.
During  the  same  period, Mexican  imports  grew  from  $1.4  billion  to  almost  $12
billion.
While  these  figures  indicate  the  growing  importance  of  bilateral  trade,  they
do  not  illustrate  the  asymmetry  of  the  trade.  Mexican  trade  with  the  United
States accounts  for  two-thirds  of  its  exports and  imports,  while  that  for  the
United States  with  its  neightbor  is  only  6 percent  of  the  total.  Mexico  has
been much more  vulnerable  to  shocks  from  the  United  States  than  the  reverse,
but with growing interdependence,  trade  and  policies  must  be  interpreted  in a
different  light.  Analysis  of  exchange  must  consider  all  flows,  not  only  of
goods and services, but of labor, capital, technology, tastes, and values.
Evaluation within  this  framework  suggests  dynamic  adjustment  will  bring  about
some  degree  of  convergence  in  factor  prices  and  incomes.  Convergence  depends
on  the  conditions  of  exchange  which  in  an  analytical  sense  can  range  from
"full  exchange"--a  North  American  Common  Market--to  autarchy  or  no  exchange.
These two  extremes  provide insights  into the  process  of adjustment;  neither is
advocated as a policy framework.
The  exchange  framework  is  especially  useful  in  evaluating  alternatives  given
the  current  economic  crisis  in  Mexico.  The  United  States  has  a  vested
interest  in  the  recovery of  the Mexican economy and  in  the  convergence  of  the
two  economies.  The  exchange  model  suggests  that  the  United  States  can
facilitate  the  flow  of  capital  to  the  Mexican  economy  and  the  flow  of  goods
and  services  out  or  face  the  increased  flow  of  labor  migration  into  the  U.S.
economy.  The  key  question  is  which  flow  or  exchange  and  at  what  dimension
will be least disruptive to  the  two economies.
The  most  general  hypothesis  is  that  exchange  between  the  United  States  and
Mexico  will  continue  to  lead  to  some  degree  of  convergence  of  the  wages  of
unskilled  labor.  That  adjustment  will  occur  with  or  without  increased  trade
of agricultural commodities,  but  that  agricultural trade  is  likely to make  the
process  less  disruptive  of  income  and  employment  in  the  United  States  than
adjustment through migration and capital movement.
The  performance  of  the  past  few  years  reveals  how  distorted  the  process  of
exchange  can  become  if  the  policies  of  either country  ignore  the  consequences
for  the  other  country  as  well  as  the  adverse  effects  of  resulting  feedback
mechanisms.  Attempts  by  Mexico  to  increase  its  growth and  independence  from
the  United  States  led  to  vastly  expanding  borrowing  and  accelerated  imports
from  the  United  States,  leading  ultimately  to  increased  dependence.  U.S.
measures  have  squeezed  Mexico's  debt  service  capacity  and  export  potential,
with  negative  consequences  for  U.S.  creditors.  The  subsequent  peso
5devaluation  and  exchange  controls  cut  imports  from  the  United  States  and
increased  the  competitive  position  of  Mexican  exports.  To  protect  against
these  imports  will  reduce  Mexico's  debt  service  capacity,  threatening  U.S.
banks  and leading to  increased migration.  In  short,  there  is  no  way  to  avoid
adjustments  between  the  two  countries.  Functional  interdependence  must  be
faced and  policies  pursued  that  will  manage  interdependence  in  the  interests
of both countries.
Dimensions of U.S.-Mexican Agricultural Interdependence
by Myles J. Mielke
The  reasons  for  U.S.-Mexican  interdependence  have  to  do  with  geography,
cultural  and  economic  ties  across  the  2,000-mile  common  border,  and  the
substantial  presence of  U.S.  business  and  investments  in  the  Mexican  domestic
economy.  U.S.-Mexican  interdependence  was  reinforced  with  the  development  of
Mexican  petroleum  reserves  and  exports  during  the  seventies  and  two  serious
agricultural  production  shortfalls  (1979  and  1982)  that  necessitated
unprecedented imports.
Mexican  economic  growth  has  temporarily  been  curtailed  by  the  country's
serious  financial  crisis  and  the  measures  taken  to  reduce  inflation  and  public
spending.  These  measures  have  further  tied Mexico's  economy  and  trade  to  the
United States.  Foreign debt  servicing  is  largely  to  satisfy loans  extended by
U.S.  financial  institutions--some  58  percent  of  the  total  debt.  The  current
account  deficit  is  also  a  major  factor  in  Mexico's  efforts  to  trim  imports  and
expand exports.  This,  in turn, affects interdependency  as Mexico  is  the  third
largest  U.S.  trading  partner,  after  Japan  and  Canada.  It  is  by  far  the  most
important Latin American trading partner.
The  growth  of  agricultural  imports  over  the  past  several  years  resulted
largely from demand outpacing production.  Per capita  production  of  major  crop
and livestock  products during  the  seventies  tended  to  stagnate.  At  the  same
time  consumption  was  stimulated  by  a  rapidly  expanding  economy  (7-8  percent
per year) and generous  food subsidies.
The United States  has  become  an increasingly  important  source of  supply.  The
U.S.  share of  Mexican agricultural  imports went  from an average  58  percent  in
the  early  seventies  to  78  percent  in  recent  years.  By  comparison,  the
relative  importance  of  the  United  States  as  a  source  of  total  trade  has
remained relatively  constant at  63 percent.
The  United  States  is  expected to  be  the  principal supplier  of  food  grains  and
feed  grains  in  1984,  but  other  exporters  could  enter  the  market  if  U.S.  export
credit guarantees are not extended  beyond December 1983.  If  credit guarantees
are  not  forthcoming,  we  can  expect  Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada,  and  the  EC
countries  to  increase  their  trade  with  Mexico.  In  the  past,  Canada  has  been
willing  to  offer  concessional  credit  in  wheat  sales  and  Brazil  has  offered  to
barter soybeans for oil.
Mexican  agricultural  exports  earlier  averaged  over  $500  million  (1969/71)  and
rose  to  an  average  $1.8  billion  (1979/81).  This  is  a  much  smaller  growth  than
for imports and has  generated  a negative trade  balance  in  recent years.  Once
accounting  for  over  30  percent  of  total  exports,  farm  exports  now  average
6around  10  percent.  The  drop in  the  agricultural share  is  largely  the  result
of  the  growth  in  petroleum  exports  and  the  emphasis  on  economic  development
policy to promote industrial production and exports.
Both  the  United  States  and  Mexico  have  been  at  odds  over  specific  trade
regulations,  tariff  structures,  and  other  external  policies  for  many  years.
For Mexico's  part,  this  involves  a gradual  shift away  from  import  substitution
and  towards  a  greater  diversification  of  the  export  trade.  The  latter
reflects  the  desire  to  move  away  from  the  heavy  dependence  on  the  United
States as both a supplier and market for Mexican trade.
Mexico  maintains  a wide  range  of  ad  valorem  import  duties  ranging  from  zero
percent  on  basic  foods  and  some  agro-industrial  inputs  needed  to  supplement
domestic  supplies  to  very  high  levels  for  so-called  luxury  items.  All
agricultural  imports  require  a  permit  and  the  terms,  including  the  tariff
rate,  are  subject  to  change  without  notice.  Mexico  has  refused  to  join  the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.
Through  bilateral  agreements,  the  U.S.  Government  has  helped  Mexico  import
large quantities  of  grains and oilseeds  since 1980.  A 1983 agreement  provided
$1.7 billion between October 1982 and December 1983.
Major  devaluations in  February and August  of 1982  helped  alleviate  the  export
slump  but  raised  import  prices.  U.S.  trade  with  Mexico,  however,  was
relatively unaffected by these measures.  The large  public sector purchases of
bulk food commodities under  the  bilateral  trade agreement  were  not  subject  to
exchange  rate  controls.  The  two-tier  exchange  regime  initiated  in  December
1982  is  still  in  effect.  The  official  rate  is  currently  being  devalued  at  13
centavos  per  day  in  an  attempt  to  unify  the  official  and  free-market  rates.
U.S.-Mexican Agricultural Trade Relations
by Richard A.  Smith
U.S.  agricultural  trade  policy  toward  Mexico  reflects  overall  U.S.
agricultural  trade  policy  objectives  of  expanding  U.S.  farm  exports  and
working  for  a  free  and  liberal  world  market  system.  However,  Mexico  does
benefit  from  a number  of  special  U.S.  policies  and  cooperative  programs  not
available  to  all  other  countries.  Mexico  in  1982  was  the  third  largest
agricultural  supplier  to  the  U.S.  market  and  was  the  United  States'  ninth
largest  market  for  farm  goods.  The  United  States  has  been  Mexico's  largest
supplier  of  grain,  although  other  exporting  countries  have  recently  made
substantial  inroads  into  the  Mexican  market.  Virtually  all  of  Mexico's  corn
and sorghum imports come  from  the  United  States.  Mexico  is  also an important
market  for  U.S.  oilseeds  and  products.  Mexico  markets  more  than  60  percent  of
its  total  exports  in  the  United  States.
Mexico  was  once  a  major  exporter  of  grains,  beef,  livestock,  and  sugar.  The
seventies,  however,  marked  a  major  turning  point  largely  as  a  result  of  new,
large  oil  findings,  and  the  spread  of  economic  development  and  increased
demand,  especially  the  demand  for  proteins.  Agricultural  production  did  not
keep  pace,  population  growth  burgeoned,  and  Mexico  now  relies  heavily  on
imports  to meet its food needs.The  United  States  has  signed agricultural  supply agreements with  Mexico.  The
current  agreement  covered  $1.7  billion  in  agricultural  trade  during  1982-83.
The  United  States  has  also  extended  export  credit  guarantees  (GSM-102)  to
Mexico  to  guarantee  the  repayment of  loans  that  banks  make  to  Mexico  for  the
purchase  of  food  imports.  Mexico  was  the  largest  recipient  of  GSM-102  in
fiscal year 1983.  The GSM-102 allocation  to Mexico  is  important to  the United
States;  it  guarantees  exports  of  7 million tons  of  feed  grains,  1.2  million
tons of oilseeds, and $143 million of other commodities.
U.S.-Mexican  agricultural  trade  relations  are  characterized  by  some
difficulties.  The  Mexican  Government  controls  trade  of  many  agricultural
products  with  licensing  requirements,  and  import  and  export  taxes.  On  the
U.S.  side,  import  restrictions  applied  to  Mexican  goods  consist  generally  of
relatively  low  import  duties.  For  coffee,  cocoa,  and  bananas,  few  trading
problems  exist.  They enter  the United  States  duty  free  or  at  times under  the
Generalized System of  Preferences  (GSP).  Many Mexican agricultural  exports  to
the  United  States,  including  winter  vegetables,  strawberries,  and  melons,
compete  with  U.S.  products.  The  most  publicized  and  recurrent  example  of
trade  conflict  is  the  competition  between  Mexico's  and  Florida's  winter
tomatoes,  cucumbers,  eggplants,  squash,  and  green  peppers.  An  additional
complication arises  from the  fact  that Mexico  is not  a member  of  the GATT and
thus  faces  few  external  obligations  with  regard  to  its  trade  policy.
Fortunately,  there  are  a number  of  effective  mechanisms  in  place  to  prevent
and resolve U.S.-Mexican trade disputes.
Domestic Policy and Trade Interactions:  The Case of Mexico
by Nicole Ballenger and Alex F. McCalla
Agricultural trade  defines  an  important  set  of  linkages  between  the  U.S.  and
the  Mexican  economies.  These  linkages  can  be  direct  through  bilateral
relationships--e.g.,  vegetables--or  indirect  through  interactions  in  world
markets  where  both countries  participate  as  exporters  and/or  importers.  The
nature  of these trade  aspects--the composition of trade,  quantities  exchanged,
and  their values--is  influenced  by  the  agricultural  policies  of  both nations.
International  conditions  may  also,  however,  be  important  factors  in  the
formation  of  these  domestic  policies.  Mexico's  recently  cancelled  food
self-sufficiency  program  (SAM),  for  example,  provoked  serious  question  about
the  country's  ability  to  eliminate  grain  imports.  Its  demise,  however,  is
generally attributed to  Mexico's ill-fortune in world markets.
A  possible  approach  to  modeling  U.S.-Mexican  interdependencies  through  trade
is  to  start  with  national  agricultural  policy  models,  build  in  international
components,  and identify  the set  of trade  linkages  by which ,the models  can be
connected.  In  this  paper an agricultural policy model for Mexico  is presented
which, it is hoped, is a useful step in  this  direction.  The model is based on
the  concept  of  multi-level  programming,  whereby  it  is  recognized  that  the
policymakers'  problem  is  to  optimize  national  objectives  by  attempting  to
influence a myriad of independent decisionmakers by policy interventions.  The
model allows  the  development of  policy  tradeoff  frontiers which  recognize  the
choices  between  sometimes  disparate  goals  that  policymakers  must  deal  with.
International market conditions influence the  positioning of  these frontiers.
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conclusions.  First,  pricing  policies  (for  several  commodities  and  chemical
inputs)  differ  quite  significantly  in  their  usefulness  for  attaining  any
single  policy  objective  (such  as  employment,  food  production,  sector  income,
or  foreign exchange).  Second, whether or not any  two objectives  can be  viewed
as  complementary  or  competitive  depends  on  the  available  set  of  policy
instruments,  the  levels  at  and  the  mixes  in  which  they  are  employed.
Furthermore,  it  is  possible  to  combine  multiple  instruments  effectively  in
order to maximize  the value of  some combination of  several objectives.
The  choice  of an  optimal instrument  package  and  the  rates  at  which  goals  must
be  exchanged  are  functions  of  conditions  in  world  markets.  Several
sensitivity tests were conducted  to determine  the  response  of  the agricultural
sector  to  changes  in  the  international  environment,  especially  to  those  which
might  come  about  because  of  U.S.  agricultural  policy  decisions.  These
involved movements  in  grain  import  prices  and  changes  in restrictions  imposed
vis-a-vis  Mexican  exports.  The  results  indicated quite  important  effects  on
the  policy  objectives,  suggesting  that  world  market  conditions  may
significantly  influence  policy  choice.  A  next  step  would  be  to  quantify  how
the  important  world market  variables  (from Mexico's  perspective)  are  affected
by changes  in policy in major countries such as the United  States.
Discussion by David R. Mares
Smith  makes  three  points  in  his  presentation:  the  U.S.-Mexican  relation  is
unique;  the United States  has  a stake  in  the  economic  and  political  stability
of  Mexico;  and  each  nation  should  maximize  its  respective  comparative
advantages  in the  relationship.  His  talk emphasizes  how  much  has  been  done  to
the  mutual  benefit  of  both  countries.  But,  how  much  has  been  done  is not
really the  question to  ask.  Rather we should ask  under what  circumstances  has
this  been accomplished.  If we  did  a comprehensive  study,  we  might  find  that
U.S. help  for  Mexico  correlates  quite well  with  dire  economic  crises  in  Mexico
and/or  U.S.  problems  of  surplus  stocks.  This  is  not  an  optimal  way  to
contribute  to  the  development  of  Mexico.  We  also  need  to  compare  results  with
what  Mexico  has  asked  for  before  we  can  compliment  ourselves  on  how  much  is
being done.  I wish  to  ask  Mr.  Smith  to  clarify  how  the  U.S.-Mexican  supply
agreement  actually works.  Some  of  my  USDA  sources  play  down  its  importance,
noting  that  all  we  are  committed  to  doing  is facilitating  Mexican  access  to
established  commercial, and not official,  channels.
Gutierrez-Kirchner's presentation  is  a valuable  one because  it illuminates  the
thinking  of  the  current  Mexican administration  on  trade  matters.2/  He  makes
two  major  points.  First,  that  Mexico  will  show  greater  respect  for
comparative  advantage  and  let  trade,  rather  than  Government  inducements,  be
the  engine  of  growth.  Second,  that Mexico  wants  a  bilateral  solution  to  the
U.S.  discriminatory  and  unilateral  application  of  countervailing  duty  and
graduation  policies.  My  comments  are  oriented  to  the  question  of  comparative
advantage.  Mexico  would  be  better  off  importing  milk  rather  than  continuing
to  subsidize  its  inefficient  production in Mexico.  But this  is because Mexico
is  trying  to  use  technology  which  is  not  appropriate.  There  are  efforts,  and
I  suggest  one  examine  Dr.  Tourrent's  efforts  at  the  Secretaria  de  Agricultura
y Recursos Hidraulicos  (SARH),  to utilize alternative technologies which will
2/  Alfredo  Gutierrez-Kirchner  made  an  oral  presentation  on  "Future  North
American  Agricultural  Trade  Relations:  Mexican  Perspective."enable  the  country  to  be  come  self-sufficient  in  milk.  This  leads  me  to  my
broader  point.  To  import  means  having  the  infrastructure  to  receive  and
distribute  the  goods:  railroads, harbor, and  storage facilities.  Mexico  does
not have an infrastructure adequate  to  handle  the  massive  food  imports  that  a
static  view  of  comparative  advantage  implies.  Rather  than  scarce  capital
investments  in  expanding  this  capacity,  there  are  other  investments  which
could alleviate food problems and at the same time help distribute wealth.
Reynolds  presented  us  with  a  stimulating  analysis  of  the  increasing
interdependence  of  the  U.S.  and  the  Mexican  economies  and  a  call  for  making
policy with  that  reality  in  mind.  He  recognizes  the  socio-political  problems
with  a  complete  merging  of  the  two  economies  and  does  not  call  for  a  North
American  Common  Market.  Still,  he  insists  that  Mexico  would  be  better  off
importing its  basic  grains  from  the  United  States  and  exporting  certain  high
value crops to pay  for  them.  I defend  the  production of winter vegetables for
export  and  argue that  their  impact  on  basic  grain production  is  marginal;  the
Ballenger and McCalla model  illustrates  this.  Nevertheless, it  still  appears
to  be  almost  a  "national  sacrificial  act"  for  Mexico  to  accept  such  a  high
dependence on  basic  foods  from  the  United  States.  U.S.  embargoes against  the
Soviets,  Nicaragua,  and  almost  anyone  who  wants  to  have  either  a  foreign
policy  or  a  domestic  political  economy  different  from  that  of  the  United
States are  potential threats.  The  food weapon doesn't always work, but mainly
because  some  states  have  the  ability  to  enforce  changes  in  domestic
consumption patterns  to  offset  the effect of  the  boycott.  To  do  so  implies  a
strong authoritarian state  and  in  the  Mexican  case  could  strain  the  relative
openness  of the Mexican authoritarian  state,  an outcome  many of  us  would  like
to avoid.
Reynolds  has  given  us  the  "why we  should"  scenario  with  respect  to  policy
making in the  bilateral  context.  We  also need  to  address  the  "why it  hasn't
been  done"  issue.  We  can't  make  policy  differently  if  we  don't  analyze  the
obstacles to alternative  policy formulation.  I suggest  that  they are embedded
in the  structure  of  U.S.  policy formation,  specifically  in  the  congressional,
electoral,  and  bureaucratic  arenas.  Because  the  United  States  was  such  a
large  country  endowed  with  great  resources,  society  has  had  the  luxury  of
ignoring international issues,  except in  the  case  of  direct military conflict,
usually  entered  into  only  reluctantly.  Therefore,  the  U.S.  policymaking
process  is  like  the  Ballenger/McCalla  multi-level  model:  it  includes
competing  interests.  Some  issues  are  perceived  as  purely  local,  shortrun
issues  and these  generally  take  precedence  over  trade  and international  ones,
unless  the  latter  involve  war  or  have  a  negative  impact  on  some  U.S.
interests.  This  means  it  is  inherently  difficult  to  make  what  are  perceived
as  U.S.  "sacrifices"  in  favor  of  interdependence  unless  that  interdependence
is  perceived  on  a  military-strategic  level.  Even  here,  the  power  of  this
justification may be weakening.
What  can be  done?  And how can we  do  it?  We  need  to elevate  economic  issues
to  the  level  of  "high  politics,"  but  in  such  a  manner  as  to  avoid
provincialism.  To do  so  requires  political leadership and a massive campaign
to  reach the  U.S.  public.  We  did  it  for  the  Cold  War, now  we need  to  do  it
for  interdependence.  The  failure  of  the  United  States  to  deal  with
interdependence  has  serious  implications:  it  would  suggest  that  democratic
politics are impossible  in an interdependent world.
10Discussion by  Stephen J. Torok
Mielke  has  presented  an  overview  of  U.S.-Mexican  agricultural  trade  inter-
dependence.  Several  factors  reinforced  agricultural  trade  interdependency
between  the  United States  and Mexico,  including:  the  combination  of  petroleum
exports  and  Mexican  agricultural  production  shortfalls  of  1979  and  1982;
Mexico's  foreign debt  servicing;  and  measures to  reduce Mexico's  inflation and
public  spending.
Mielke  noted  that  Mexico's  agricultural  imports  were  greatly  increased  in  the
late  seventies  and  early  eighties.  The  increase  in  agricultural  imports  to
Mexico were a result  of  several  factors  including:  reductions  in  per  capita
production  of  major  crop  and  livestock  products,  and  increases  in  Mexico's
domestic  demand  for  agricultural  commodities  that  were  directly  or  indirectly
subsidized  by  Mexico.  The  U.S.  share  of  Mexico's  imports  has  increased  to
over  75  percent.
A  major  contribution  by  Mielke  was  his  evaluation  of  the  future  of  Mexico's
agricultural  imports  from  the  United  States.  Mielke  suggests  that  a
combination  of  factors  affect  the  future  of  Mexico's  imports  of  U.S.
agricultural  commodities.  Factors  such  as  the  price  competitiveness  of  U.S.
feed  grains  in  Mexico,  the  uncertainty  of  U.S.  export  credit  guarantees  to
Mexico, and  the  relative  strength  of  the U.S.  dollar  will  influence  Mexico's
decision to diversify its  share of agricultural  imports from abroad.
Mielke's  discussion of U.S.-Mexican  agricultural trade  interdependence  did  not
make  use  of  Reynolds  methodology  of  incorporating  a  "full  exchange  setting"
for  looking  at U.S.-Mexican  agricultural  trade  interdependence.  A  discussion
of  trade  in  factors  of  production  including unskilled  labor  from  Mexico  is
warranted  for  a  complete  understanding  of  U.S.-Mexican  agricultural  trade
interdependence.
General Discussion
Schwedel  disagreed  with Mares'  comments  about substituting  grain  imports  with
domestic  production,  noting  that  Mexico  does  not  have  the  internal
distribution  network  to  service  the  domestic  production.  He  noted  that  the
questions  were  whether  Mexico  could  change  production  and  land  tenure
structures  to  permit  production of  high-value  crops  and  asked what  those  crops
might  be.  Mares  replied  that  if  both  importing  and  domestic  production
required  substantial  investments,  the  latter  would  spread  the  benefits  to  a
much larger  portion  of  Mexican  society.  Reynolds  suggested  spices,  fruits,
and  tropical  products  in  general would  be  suitable  export  products  for  Mexico
if  attention were  paid  to  comparative  advantages  and  trade  restrictions.  He
also  rejected  the  idea  of  food  dependence  by  Mexico  as  being  an  act  of
"national sacrifice,"  pointing  out  that  Mexico  already  was  dependent  upon  the
U.S.  security  umbrella.  Reynolds  commented  that  if  Mexico  starved  simply
because  it  did  not  want  to  import  that  also  would  be  such  a  sacrifice  and
rejected  the  idea  that  alternative  technologies  could  provide  Mexico  with  a
domestic  solution.  Smith  agreed  with  Reynolds  on  the  technology  issue  and
noted  that  an  important  question  is  how  to  deal  with  the  land  tenure  issue.
Hardy  pointed  out  that  the  discussion  ignored  internal  conflicts  of  interest
in  both  societies  as  to  the  goals  of  agricultural  development.  Mines  noted
the  importance  of  this  question  by  suggesting  that  the  problems  of  production
in  Mexican  rainfed  areas  were  social  rather  than  economic.
11Reynolds  noted  that  the  Binational  Project  on  U.S.-Mexico  relations
demonstrated  that  much could  be  done  in  rainfed  areas  of  Mexico,  but  claimed
that the present Mexican administration was not interested and did  not want to
hear  U.S.  investigators  tell  them  about  it.  He  also  claimed  that  the  vast
majority  of  Mexican  economists  did  not  agree  with  the  austerity  program.
Gutierrez-Kirchner  ended  the  discussion  by  disagreeing  with  Reynolds,  noting
that  it  was  only  economists  who  belonged  to  the  political  oppositions  that
disagreed with the austerity program.
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The Politics of Mexican Agricultural Policy
by Steven E. Sanderson
The  rationale  for  intervention  in  the  agricultural  sector  by  the  Mexican
Government  has  altered  radically  since  the  Mexican  revolution.  Mexican
agricultural  policy  has  evolved  considerably  since  the  midthirties.  A  major
constraint  on  the  formulation  and  execution  of  agricultural  policy  has  been
the  "internationalization"  or  increased openness  to  external  shocks  of Mexican
agriculture.  The  food  self-sufficiency  program,  Sistema  Alimentario  Mexicano
(SAM),  and  its  successor,  Programma  Nacional  Alimentaria  (PRONAL),  are  the
most  recent  examples  of  state  intervention  in  the  agricultural  sector  and  of
how  the  constraints  imposed  by  the  openness  of  the  Mexican  agricultural
economy  influence  policy.
From  its  initial  emphasis  on  land  reform,  the Mexican  Government  turned  first
to  policies  aimed  at  stimulating  productivity  and  increasing  output  in  the
agricultural  sector  to  efforts  to  make  the  agricultural  sector  an  engine  for
growth  and  an  adjunct  to  the  industrialization  of  the  Mexican  economy.  In
recent  years,  the Mexican Government  has  looked  to  the  agricultural  sector  as
a  source  of  food  self-sufficiency,  or  more  recently  "food  sovereignty."
During  the  seventies,  Mexican agricultural  policy  made  a  dramatic  shift.  In
the  forties  and  fifties  political  emphasis  had  changed  from  agrarian  reform
to  counterreform  and  subsidiarity  to  industrialization.  In  the  seventies,
the  logic  of  state  intervention  shifted  from a  declining  export  and  commer-
cially oriented  agriculture as an adjunct of industrialization  to a new concept
of  agriculture as  the driving force behind  national food self-sufficiency.
The  SAM  had  a  short  life  span,  1980-82.  It  was  intended  to  provide
self-sufficiency  in  basic  foodstuffs  for  Mexico  by  the  year  1985.  The  goals
of  SAM were  to  produce more  food  as  a hedge against  imports,  to  revive  rural
production  in  marginal  areas,  and  to  enhance  rural  production  in  general
through  producer  incentives  and  state  intervention.  SAM  failed  for  a  number
of  reasons.  It  was  never  successfully  integrated  into  the Mexican Government
as  its  functions  were  hostile  to  many  entrenched  bureaucratic  interests.  It
had  to  compete  for  control  of  the  agricultural  sector  and  agricultural
policymaking  with  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  CONASUPO,  and  the  Ministry  of
Commerce,  all well-entrenched  bureaucratic  agencies.  The  internationalization
of  Mexican agriculture  and  agribusiness  interests were antithetical  to  many of
the  goals  of  SAM.  The  fiscal  and  foreign  exchange  crisis  which  Mexico
experienced  in  1982  dried  up  the  financial  resources  so  necessary  to  the
successful  implementation  of  SAM.
Future  Mexican  agricultural  policy  will  be  constrained  by  the  necessity  of
being  responsive  to  the  general  structure of  Mexican politics.  The political
base  for  the  kind  of  redistribution  implied  by  SAM  may  not  be  sufficiently
broad  to  permit  agricultural  policy  to  move  in  that  direction.  The  openness
of  the Mexican  economy,  especially  its  status  as  a  debtor  country,  will  also
constrain  state  strategy  and  policies  for  the  agricultural  sector.  Fiscal
austerity  will  limit  the  scope  for  agricultural  policymaking  of  the  kind
implied  by  SAM.  However,  some  program  of  food  security  will  survive  and  will
be  implemented  through  institutional  channels  other  than  SAM.  But  fiscal
constraint  on  SAM-like  policies,  subsidies,  and  other  forms  of  state
13intervention will severely limit agricultural  policymaking in the  tradition of
rural patronage.
The Changing Dimensions of Mexican Food Consumption and the Ability of
Mexican Agriculture to Meet Consumption Requirements
by S. Kenneth Schwedel
In  the  early  fifties,  Mexico  embarked  on  a  policy  designed  to  promote  and
develop  its  industrial  base.  The  programs  that  the  Mexican  Government
followed  had  the  dual  effect  of  slowing  the  growth  rate  in  agricultural
production  and,  at  the  same  time,  (2)  stimulating  food  demand  while
facilitating  changes  in  consumption  patterns  towards  animal  protein  and
oilseeds.
Taking  into  consideration  tax  and investment  policies  along with bank  lending
activity during the fifties  through 1965,  there was net  flow of  capital out of
agriculture.  At  the same  time, real  crop prices have  fallen continually since
1954.  The annual  average  growth rate fell  from 6.2  percent during  the  fifties
to 5.4 percent  in the sixties, and 3.4 percent in the seventies.
Throughout  the  sixties  and  into  the  seventies,  the  decline  in agricultural
output, contrasted by a growing and  subsidized  industrial economy,  accelerated
the  emigration  from  rural  areas  into  the  country's  urban  centers.  As  the
cities  grew,  a number  of  Government  policies  were  simultaneously  stimulating
and shifting demand.  Between 1960  and 1980,  the minimum wage rate  grew almost
twice as fast as food costs as a result  of price  controls on key consumer  food
items.  Among the  products  under  price  control were  milk,  eggs,  and vegetable
oil.  Government retail distribution outlets were  predominantly located in  the
larger towns  and  cities,  having a positive  income-transfer effect on the urban
poor.
The effect  of  slowdown  in  production with  the  growth  in  demand  caused  Mexico
to turn to  international markets  in the  early  seventies  to  supplement domestic
food  and  feed  supply.  By  1980,  Mexico's  traditional  positive  agricultural
trade balance of payments  turned negative.
With  no  change  in  policy,  present  prospects  are  for  continued  imports  of
agricultural  commodities.  Mexico's  population  growth--estimated  at  2 to  2.5
percent annually--and the  recovery of  its  economy beginning in 1984 will  cause
demand  to  grow  by  at  least  4.5  percent  through  1988.  Technological,
financial,  and  resource  limitations  will  not  permit  agricultural  output  to
grow  fast  enough  to  satisfy  demand.  Mexico's  recently,  announced
consumer-oriented  National  Food  Program  appears  to  confirm  this  projection,
with  food  imports  of  8.4 million metric tons  planned  for  1988,  the  last  year
of the present administration.
14The  Supply  of and  Demand  for  Mexican  Labor  in  California  Agriculture:
A Binational Issue
by Richard Mines
California's  labor  intensive  agriculture  has  experienced  unparalleled  growth
and  prosperity.  Still,  it faces  two  important  challenges:  it  has  a  serious
income  problem among  many  of  the  farmworkers who  perform  seasonal  farm  tasks
and it faces  the  challenge  of  making  the  proper  technological  choices  in  the
coming years.
Though there is much variety  in  the  institutional  structure of  California  farm
labor  markets,  at  the  level  of  the  worksite  we  usually  find  a  Mexican  foreman
supervising  and  setting  the working  conditions  for  Mexican  immigrant  workers.
In  effect,  Mexican  foremen  match  the  supply  and  demand  in  California  crop
agriculture and supervise  the seasonal  farm labor force.
The farm labor market has  always  depended  on first generation  rural  immigrants
in California;  in  the  postwar period, employers  have  turned to  Mexicans.  Most
of  these  workers  are  settled  immigrants  from  Mexico's  Central  Highlands  but  an
important  subgroup  are  young  unaccompanied  male Mexicans  who  do  a  large  part
of  the  heavy  manual  tasks.  All  these  groups  derive  most  income  from  U.S.
farmwork  though  the  settled  ones  also  rely  on  nonfarmwork  and  unemployment
insurance benefits.
Since  World  War  II,  there  have  been  two  important  trends:  increased
production  of  labor  intensive  crops  and  mechanization  of  many  hand  tasks.
These  two  trends  have  tended  to  cancel  each  other  out  and  have  left  the  demand
for  seasonal  labor  quite  high.  The  demand  for  heavy  hand  labor,  done mostly
by  young  male  Mexicans,  is  particularly  noticeable  requiring  the  continual
replenishment of new workers at  the entry level.
Despite  obstacles,  another  spurt  in  mechanization  of  fruit  and  vegetable
production  is  in  the  offing.  Rational  policy  would  try  to  smooth  this
transition by  encouraging  the  Mexican  immigrant  farm labor  force  to  gradually
settle  north  of  the  border  and  participate  in  the  transformation  of  California
agriculture.  This  would  imply improved  personnel  practices,  encouragement  of
the  correct  technological innovations,  and immigration  reform.
Discussion by Stephen J. Torok
Sanderson has presented  a recorrido  (rapid  tour)  of  agricultural policy  trends
in  Mexico.  He  recognized  a "fundamental  contradiction  in  Mexico."  This  is
the  situation  whereby Mexico  is  currently a leading  agricultural  exporter of
various agricultural  commodities  to  many  nations;  but  simultaneously,  Mexico
is  unable  to  provide  its  population  with  sufficient  foodstuffs.  Sanderson
pointed  out  that  Mexico  is  experiencing  a  heavy  reliance  on  domestic
government  intervention  in  its  food  distribution  system with  an  emphasis  on
public  food  redistribution  in  order  to  allocate  an  adequate  level  of  basic
foodstuffs  to its  population.
It  appears  that  Mexico's  agricultural  development,  as  suggested  by  Sanderson,
has  been  undermined  by  the  "internationalization"  of  agriculture  in  Mexico.
The  process  of  "internationalization"  has  manifested  itself  in  a variety  of
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"internationalized"  urban  palates,  the  allocation  of  Mexican  agricultural
commodities  as  imports  to  transnational  agribusinesses,  and  the  influence  of
external "actors" on Mexico's public economy.
The  contribution  of  Sanderson's  paper  is  important  to  our  understanding  of
Mexico's  agricultural  politics.  The  concept  of  "internationalization"  is
timely.  A  few  important  questions  are  left  unanswered,  such  as  what  is  the
future of Mexico's agricultural "internationalization?"
The  presentation  by  Schwedel  concentrated  on  the  demand  side  of  Mexican
agriculture.  The  focus  of  previous  research  on  Mexican  agriculture  rarely
treated  domestic  agricultural  consumption  and  Schwedel's  research  is  long
awaited  and  necessary  for  a  comprehensive  view  of  Mexican  agriculture.
Schwedel's  observations  and  statistical  display  of  Mexican  agriculture
suggests  that  Mexico's  policies  and  changes  in  Mexico's  socioeconomic
characteristics  have  led  to  increases  in  the  demand  for  agricultural
commodities  in  Mexico.  It  appears  that  the  increase  in  the  demand  has
occurred  in  recent  years  as  a  result  of:  increases  in  Mexico's  population,
domestic  policies  encouraging  rural  immigration  to  urban  cities,  increases  in
Mexico's  per  capita  income,  changes  in  Mexico's  wage  rates,  and  domestic
policies  leading to reductions  in domestic agricultural prices.
There  has  been  a  change  in  Mexico's  agricultural  consumption  pattern,  as
pointed  out  by Schwedel,  that  has  resulted  in  an  increase  in  the  consumption
of animal  protein and  a  resulting  decrease  in  traditional  foodstuffs  such  as
tortillas  and  beans.  These  changes  in  Mexico's  consumption  pattern  have
influenced  imports  of  feed  grains  and  breeding  livestock  imports  from  the
United States.
Schwedel's  report  fills  a  void  in  research  on  Mexico's  domestic  demand  for
agricultural  commodities.  His  presentation  yields  an  important  question
regarding Mexican agricultural trade:  Is  it  possible that  changes  in Mexico's
consumption  pattern  could  be  altered  in  favor  of  domestic  consumption  of
Mexico's  agricultural  exports--such  as  fresh  fruits  and  vegetables--in  order
to  reduce Mexico's agricultural import  burden?
16RESEARCH NEEDS
ERS Research Needs as Related to Mexican Agriculture
by  David  L.  Peacock
A  major  purpose  of  ERS  research  on  the  Mexican  agricultural  sector  is  to
improve  its  capacity  to  interpret  the  importance  of  current  events  and
project,  as  accurately  as  possible,  changes  in  production,  consumption,  and
trade.  In  addition  to  providing  the  public  with  research  information,  ERS
research  must  provide  the  quantitative  measures  of  cause  and  effect
relationships,  the  coefficients,  and  the  models  which analysts  can  draw upon
to respond  to  current  questions.  The  long-term objective  is  to  develop  policy
sensitive  models  representing  the  Mexican  agricultural  sector,  which  can  be
the  basic  tools  for  analyzing  a wide  variety  of  possible  economic  events  and
projecting directions.
One  of  the  perplexing  problems  faced  by  ERS  is  to  manage  the  combination  of
the long lead time inherent  in  research and  the short  lead  time  for  responding
to  current  questions.  One  way  to  deal  with  this  problem  is  to  look  for  means
of reducing  the  lead time  on research  projects such as  building automated  data
bases  and  making use  of  microcomputers.  A  second  approach  is  to  anticipate
the  geographic  locations  or  types  of  problems  which  may  become  important.
Clearly,  there will be  enough  continuing  interest  in  Mexico  to  justify  giving
it  considerable  research  priority.  A  third  approach  is  to  focus  upon
fundamental  relationships  determining  structure  and  performance  of  the
agricultural  economy as  the  basis  of  ERS  research.  Emphasis  should  be  given
to rather basic and broad research topics  in  the near  term  which  in  the  longer
term will provide the foundation for treating more  specific issues.
To  develop  the basic  quantitative relationships and models,  four  general areas
of  research  will  be  required:
o  supply potential, supply response, and variability;
o  domestic  demand;
o  macroeconomic  factors  affecting  domestic  demand  and  capacity  to
import; and
o  policy affecting supply, demand, and  trade.
Concurrent  with  individual  projects  in  these  general  areas  is  an  effort  to
develop  a  supply,  demand,  and  trade  model  for  Mexico  treating  the  major
commodities.  This  Mexican  model,  based  upon  the  Grains-Oilseeds-Livestock
modeling  efforts,  will also  provide  some structure for  the research undertaken
in  each  of  the  four  component  areas.
The  current  ERS  research  activities,  beginning  with  efforts  to  create  and
expand  an  automated  Mexican  data  base,  are  listed  below.  These  represent
studies  by  both  ERS  staff  and  cooperating  universities.
o  Data  base  automation  and  improvement--Mexico  was  the  first  priority  in
improving the data base  for Latin America.
o  Detailed  supply,  demand,  and  trade  model--A  model  based  upon  the  GOL
format is  being developed for Mexico.
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underway  to  evaluate  Mexico's  potential  to  increase  area  under
cultivation  as  a means  of  expanding  production  and  conditions  under
which such an expansion might occur.
o  Technological  change  and  research  at  international  institutions--This
project  is intended  to  evaluate  the  relationship  between  research  by
domestic  agencies  and  the  international  research  centers,  and
increases in  the yields of crops in Mexico.
o  Factors  affecting  food  consumption--A  University  of  Missouri
cooperative  study  (Maury  Bredahl)  represents  one  activity  in
evaluating  food  demand  and  consumption.  In  addition,  ERS  is  in
contact with the  Ministry  of Planning and  Budgeting  (SPP)  in  an effort
to  collaborate on an analysis of  the 1977 consumer  survey data.
o  Policy  changes  and  socioeconomic  forces  which  shape  these  policy
changes--two  cooperative studies  have been  undertaken to  assess  policy
changes  and  determine  what  forces  precipitate  policy  change  in order
to better anticipate policy developments  in Mexico.
Future  research  will  build  on  current  studies  depending  upon  the  results,
directions,  and  problem  areas  that  evolve.  In  addition,  the  following  topics
have been identified for research:
Supply:
o  Assessment of producer supply response  on a regional basis.
o  Assessment  of  the  variability  in  crop  production,  especially  yields,
and development  of a weather-crop yield model.
o  Analysis  of  the livestock sector and livestock-feed  relationships.
Demand:
Analysis  of  data  forthcoming  from consumer  surveys  planned  by  Mexico's
SPP.
Policy:
o  Analysis  of  the Mexican  grain marketing system.
o  Analysis  of  farm  credit  and  input  subsidy  policies  and  their  impact
upon production.
o  Relationship  between  agricultural  and  nonagricultural  export  levels
and Mexico's  policy on agricultural export  promotion.
Macroeconomic and Trade:
o  Evaluation  of  the  impact  of  recent  domestic  inflation  and  exchange
rate policy on Mexican food consumption patterns and  trade.
o  Changes  in  market-shares of Mexican exports and imports.
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